TheoryMarch 8, 202641 min read

創業者離脱の閾値モデル: 共同創業者はなぜ徐々にではなく相転移的に離脱するのか

信頼負債、ランウェイ圧力、外部選択肢、修復可能性から見る founder exit の状態遷移モデル

共同創業者の離脱は、気分の低下や関係悪化として物語られがちだが、実際には複数の状態変数が積み上がり、ある閾値を超えた時に非線形に起こることが多い。本稿は founder exit を threshold crossing として定式化し、離脱がどのように準備され、なぜ直前まで見えにくいのかを説明する。

founder-exitthreshold-modelgame-theorycofoundersstartup-governanceorganizational-designtrust-debtrepeated-gamesfounder-dynamicsfounder-theory-series
TheoryMarch 8, 202639 min read

Founder Exit Threshold Model: Why Cofounders Rarely Leave Gradually

A state-transition view of founder departure using trust debt, runway stress, outside options, and repair credibility

Founder departures are often narrated as emotional drift, but they behave more like threshold events. This paper models cofounder exit as a nonlinear transition: multiple stress variables accumulate over time, and once a founder's exit pressure crosses a personal threshold for long enough, the organization moves from unstable cooperation into departure dynamics.

founder-exitthreshold-modelgame-theorycofoundersstartup-governanceorganizational-designtrust-debtrepeated-gamesfounder-dynamicsfounder-theory-series
TheoryMarch 8, 202644 min read

繰り返しゲームとしての共同創業者関係: スタートアップ協力はなぜ時間軸の共有に依存するのか

割引率、相互性、家庭制約との重複ゲームから見る、共同創業者が壊れる本当の理由

スタートアップは1回限りの交渉ではない。採用、開発、資金調達、危機対応、責任分担を通じて、同じプレイヤーが何度も協力と非協力を選び続ける繰り返しゲームである。本稿は共同創業者関係を repeated game として定式化し、協力が持続する条件と、能力があっても関係が壊れる構造的理由を説明する。

repeated-gamesgame-theorycofoundersstartup-governancediscount-factorcooperationorganizational-designfounder-dynamicsfounder-theory-seriesMARIA-OS
TheoryMarch 8, 202642 min read

Repeated Games and the Cofounder Problem: Why Startup Cooperation Depends on Shared Time Horizons

Discount factors, reciprocity, and overlapping household constraints explain why capable founders still fail to sustain cooperation

A startup is not a one-shot negotiation. It is a repeated game played through hiring, product crises, financing pressure, and daily trust updates. This paper applies repeated-game theory to cofounder relationships and shows why long-term cooperation depends less on abstract loyalty than on shared time horizons, sufficiently high discount factors, and freedom from external games that dominate short-term decisions.

repeated-gamesgame-theorycofoundersstartup-governancediscount-factorcooperationorganizational-designfounder-dynamicsfounder-theory-seriesMARIA-OS