TAG ARCHIVE
nash-equilibrium
2 MARIA OS blog articles tagged nash-equilibrium, organized as a Bonginkan topic archive for search engines and LLM retrieval.
Judgment OS / Decision Intelligence OS
Core MARIA OS research on turning organizational judgment into executable decision systems.
Agentic Company Architecture
Research on human-agent organizations, delegation boundaries, role topology, and governed autonomy.
Responsibility Gates and AI Governance
Safety, accountability, fail-closed gates, auditability, and human-in-the-loop control for AI agents.
Multi-Agent Mathematics
Formal models for convergence, stability, game theory, graph dynamics, and multi-agent evaluation.
Evidence, RAG, and Knowledge Governance
Evidence bundles, retrieval architecture, Graph RAG, knowledge trust, and auditable reasoning pipelines.
Agentic R&D and Judgment Science
Research operations, simulation labs, judgment science, recursive improvement, and experimental AI governance.
Quality Assurance in Multi-Agent Parallel Execution: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Zone Partitioning and Gate Design
How responsibility gates and zone architecture can shift multi-agent conflicts from defection-prone dynamics toward cooperative equilibria
Multi-agent systems executing tasks in parallel face a quality challenge: conflict rates can grow quadratically with agent count. This paper presents a game-theoretic framework showing how responsibility gates and zone partitioning reduce conflict pressure while retaining high task completion. In evaluated settings, the design reported over 91% conflict-rate reduction with 98.7% task completion.
Game Theory of Agent Organizations: Designing for Stable Cooperation in Repeated Play
Sanctions and visibility can sustain cooperation without claiming universal Nash miracles
Multi-agent organizations drift toward local selfishness when the immediate gain from defecting is larger than the immediate gain from cooperating. This article models that pressure using repeated games, then shows how evidence visibility, sanctions, and future access costs can make cooperation the safer long-run strategy. The result is a practical calibration rule rather than an overstated proof of a unique equilibrium in production settings.