TAG ARCHIVE
game-theory
8 MARIA OS blog articles tagged game-theory. Formal models for convergence, stability, game theory, graph dynamics, and multi-agent evaluation. This canonical topic archive supports search engines and LLM retrieval.
Judgment OS / Decision Intelligence OS
Core MARIA OS research on turning organizational judgment into executable decision systems.
Agentic Company Architecture
Research on human-agent organizations, delegation boundaries, role topology, and governed autonomy.
Responsibility Gates and AI Governance
Safety, accountability, fail-closed gates, auditability, and human-in-the-loop control for AI agents.
Multi-Agent Mathematics
Formal models for convergence, stability, game theory, graph dynamics, and multi-agent evaluation.
Evidence, RAG, and Knowledge Governance
Evidence bundles, retrieval architecture, Graph RAG, knowledge trust, and auditable reasoning pipelines.
Agentic R&D and Judgment Science
Research operations, simulation labs, judgment science, recursive improvement, and experimental AI governance.
Cofounder Matching Fit Function Model: How to Evaluate Who Should Build Together
A formal model of founder pair fit using vision alignment, governance compatibility, repairability, capability complementarity, and multi-game constraints
Most founders select partners through intuition, chemistry, or convenience. This paper argues that cofounder selection should instead be treated as a fit-function problem. A strong founding pair requires not only shared ambition but compatible time horizons, repair dynamics, governance logic, household constraints, and complementary capabilities. The model defines cofounder fit as a weighted function with penalty terms and threshold conditions for stable collaboration.
Founder Exit Threshold Model: Why Cofounders Rarely Leave Gradually
A state-transition view of founder departure using trust debt, runway stress, outside options, and repair credibility
Founder departures are often narrated as emotional drift, but they behave more like threshold events. This paper models cofounder exit as a nonlinear transition: multiple stress variables accumulate over time, and once a founder's exit pressure crosses a personal threshold for long enough, the organization moves from unstable cooperation into departure dynamics.
Repeated Games and the Cofounder Problem: Why Startup Cooperation Depends on Shared Time Horizons
Discount factors, reciprocity, and overlapping household constraints explain why capable founders still fail to sustain cooperation
A startup is not a one-shot negotiation. It is a repeated game played through hiring, product crises, financing pressure, and daily trust updates. This paper applies repeated-game theory to cofounder relationships and shows why long-term cooperation depends less on abstract loyalty than on shared time horizons, sufficiently high discount factors, and freedom from external games that dominate short-term decisions.
Civilization Simulation as a Governance Laboratory: Emergent Institutional Evolution in Constrained Multi-Nation Systems
How 13 immutable laws, 4 sovereign nations, and 10-day cycles generate institutional patterns comparable to real-world governance dynamics
The Civilization simulation in MARIA OS provides a controlled environment for studying institutional evolution under constrained multi-agent dynamics. We formalize the 13 Laws as a constitutional constraint manifold, model the Civilization Evolution Index (CEI) as a multi-dimensional health metric over 90-day spans, and show that the 67% constitutional-amendment threshold creates sharp topology transitions. Game-theoretic analysis of inter-nation competition identifies Nash equilibria aligned with known institutional archetypes.
Conflict Resolution in Hierarchical Agent Teams: Practical Protocols Instead of Overstated Mechanism Proofs
Use structured scoring, bounded escalation, and explicit tie-breaks when agents disagree
Inter-agent conflict is normal in multi-agent teams. The operational challenge is not to eliminate disagreement but to resolve it with bounded delay and acceptable fairness. This article reframes conflict resolution as a protocol design problem: classify the conflict, compare admissible options under a shared scorecard, and escalate only when the local team cannot safely decide.
Multi-Universe Strategic Optimization: Minimax Theory for CEO Decision Systems
Worst-case utility optimization across parallel business universes and its implementation in MARIA OS
CEO decisions are multi-objective: each strategy affects Finance, Market, HR, and Regulatory universes with partially conflicting goals. This paper formalizes the problem as a minimax game over universe-utility vectors, derives `StrategyScore S = min_i U_i` as a robust objective candidate, constructs conflict matrices from inter-universe correlations, and characterizes a computable Pareto frontier. We connect the framework to MARIA OS MAX-gate design and report simulation results where minimax-oriented policies improved worst-case outcomes by 34% versus weighted-average baselines while retaining 91% of best-case upside.
Quality Assurance in Multi-Agent Parallel Execution: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Zone Partitioning and Gate Design
How responsibility gates and zone architecture can shift multi-agent conflicts from defection-prone dynamics toward cooperative equilibria
Multi-agent systems executing tasks in parallel face a quality challenge: conflict rates can grow quadratically with agent count. This paper presents a game-theoretic framework showing how responsibility gates and zone partitioning reduce conflict pressure while retaining high task completion. In evaluated settings, the design reported over 91% conflict-rate reduction with 98.7% task completion.
Game Theory of Agent Organizations: Designing for Stable Cooperation in Repeated Play
Sanctions and visibility can sustain cooperation without claiming universal Nash miracles
Multi-agent organizations drift toward local selfishness when the immediate gain from defecting is larger than the immediate gain from cooperating. This article models that pressure using repeated games, then shows how evidence visibility, sanctions, and future access costs can make cooperation the safer long-run strategy. The result is a practical calibration rule rather than an overstated proof of a unique equilibrium in production settings.