TAG ARCHIVE
cooperation
3 MARIA OS blog articles tagged cooperation, organized as a Bonginkan topic archive for search engines and LLM retrieval.
Judgment OS / Decision Intelligence OS
Core MARIA OS research on turning organizational judgment into executable decision systems.
Agentic Company Architecture
Research on human-agent organizations, delegation boundaries, role topology, and governed autonomy.
Responsibility Gates and AI Governance
Safety, accountability, fail-closed gates, auditability, and human-in-the-loop control for AI agents.
Multi-Agent Mathematics
Formal models for convergence, stability, game theory, graph dynamics, and multi-agent evaluation.
Evidence, RAG, and Knowledge Governance
Evidence bundles, retrieval architecture, Graph RAG, knowledge trust, and auditable reasoning pipelines.
Agentic R&D and Judgment Science
Research operations, simulation labs, judgment science, recursive improvement, and experimental AI governance.
繰り返しゲームとしての共同創業者関係: スタートアップ協力はなぜ時間軸の共有に依存するのか
割引率、相互性、家庭制約との重複ゲームから見る、共同創業者が壊れる本当の理由
スタートアップは1回限りの交渉ではない。採用、開発、資金調達、危機対応、責任分担を通じて、同じプレイヤーが何度も協力と非協力を選び続ける繰り返しゲームである。本稿は共同創業者関係を repeated game として定式化し、協力が持続する条件と、能力があっても関係が壊れる構造的理由を説明する。
Repeated Games and the Cofounder Problem: Why Startup Cooperation Depends on Shared Time Horizons
Discount factors, reciprocity, and overlapping household constraints explain why capable founders still fail to sustain cooperation
A startup is not a one-shot negotiation. It is a repeated game played through hiring, product crises, financing pressure, and daily trust updates. This paper applies repeated-game theory to cofounder relationships and shows why long-term cooperation depends less on abstract loyalty than on shared time horizons, sufficiently high discount factors, and freedom from external games that dominate short-term decisions.
Game Theory of Agent Organizations: Designing for Stable Cooperation in Repeated Play
Sanctions and visibility can sustain cooperation without claiming universal Nash miracles
Multi-agent organizations drift toward local selfishness when the immediate gain from defecting is larger than the immediate gain from cooperating. This article models that pressure using repeated games, then shows how evidence visibility, sanctions, and future access costs can make cooperation the safer long-run strategy. The result is a practical calibration rule rather than an overstated proof of a unique equilibrium in production settings.