TheoryMarch 8, 202642 min read

Repeated Games and the Cofounder Problem: Why Startup Cooperation Depends on Shared Time Horizons

Discount factors, reciprocity, and overlapping household constraints explain why capable founders still fail to sustain cooperation

A startup is not a one-shot negotiation. It is a repeated game played through hiring, product crises, financing pressure, and daily trust updates. This paper applies repeated-game theory to cofounder relationships and shows why long-term cooperation depends less on abstract loyalty than on shared time horizons, sufficiently high discount factors, and freedom from external games that dominate short-term decisions.

repeated-gamesgame-theorycofoundersstartup-governancediscount-factorcooperationorganizational-designfounder-dynamicsfounder-theory-seriesMARIA-OS
MathematicsJanuary 6, 202617 min read

Game Theory of Agent Organizations: Designing for Stable Cooperation in Repeated Play

Sanctions and visibility can sustain cooperation without claiming universal Nash miracles

Multi-agent organizations drift toward local selfishness when the immediate gain from defecting is larger than the immediate gain from cooperating. This article models that pressure using repeated games, then shows how evidence visibility, sanctions, and future access costs can make cooperation the safer long-run strategy. The result is a practical calibration rule rather than an overstated proof of a unique equilibrium in production settings.

game-theorycooperationprisoner-dilemmanash-equilibriumresponsibility-gatesmechanism-design